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Abstract 
 
During the Great War, aircraft were used primarily for reconnaissance and artillery 
spotting. The Union of South Africa’s First World War campaign in German South West 
Africa (GSWA) allowed for South Africa’s first employment of military aeroplanes in 
conventional warfare. The creation and employment of the South African Aviation 
Corps (SAAC) within the Union Defence Force (UDF) provided ground forces with a 
substantial force multiplier in terms of forward reconnaissance. The aerial 
reconnaissance allowed General Louis Botha and his subordinate commanders to gain 
a better understanding of the tactical picture and facilitated the battle concept. This 
paper discusses the role and impact of aerial operations during the GSWA campaign. 
The campaign was characterised by sweeping envelopments which were executed by 
the Union’s commandos. During the latter part of the campaign aeroplanes provided 
the UDF with intelligence in terms of the location and concentration of German forces, 
which assisted in their final encirclement. 
 
Keywords: German South West African campaign; Union Defence Force; airpower; 
First World War. 
 
Opsomming 
 
Gedurende die Eerste Wêreldoorlog was vliegtuie hoofsaaklik gebruik vir 
verkenningsdoeleindes, en om vuurleiding te gee vir artillerie. Die eerste keer wat die 
Unie van Suid-Afrika militêre vliegtuie aangewend het in ŉ konvensionele rol, was 
tydens die veldtog in Duits Suidwes-Afrika (DSWA). Die stigting en operasionele 
aanwending van die Suid-Afrikaanse Vliegkorps, as deel van die Unieverdedigingsmag 
(UVM), het die magstruktuur en aanwending van die Suid-Afrikaanse troepe ter velde 
positief beïnvloed, veral in terme van die vergroting van die operasionele 
verkenningsektor. Sodoende het Generaal Louis Botha en sy stafoffisiere ŉ beter 
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taktiese waardering van die gevegsfront gekry, wat ŉ daadwerklike invloed op die 
meegaande Suid-Afrikaanse gevegsontwerp gehad het. Hierdie artikel bespreek die rol 
en impak van lugoperasies tydens die veldtog in DSWA. Die veldtog was gekenmerk 
deur operasionele omsingelings wat op ŉ groot skaal uitgevoer was deur die UVM se 
kommando’s. Teen die einde van die veldtog het lugverkenning gehelp om die ligging 
en sterkte van die Duitse magte vasgestel, wat die finale omsingelingsaanval van die 
UVM vergemaklik het. 
 
Sleutelwoorde: Duits Suidwes-Afrika veldtog; Unieverdedigingsmag; lugkrag; Eerste 
Wêreldoorlog.  
 
Introduction 
 
The industrial revolutions of the nineteenth and early twentieth century ushered in a 
new era of technological innovation that revolutionised the way war was fought. The 
early twentieth century brought forward scientific breakthroughs which saw warfare 
take to the skies. In August 1914, the First World War commenced and ground 
operations were focused on massing superior forces at critical points in attempts to 
invade or defend the respective territories.    
 
The European powers were soon locked in a war of attrition on the Western 
Front where manoeuvre space was exhausted and the defensive position became 
favoured over the offensive which assumed the majority risk.1 The Great War became 
static because mobile operations soon turned out to be impractical with the 
preponderance of trenches and defensive obstacles on the Western Front.2 Extending 
over 600 kilometres from the North Sea to the Franco-Swiss border, the Western Front 
saw extensive operations and high intensity attrition battles. During the stalemate on 
the Western Front, military aviation became the only option to conduct mobile 
reconnaissance and artillery spotting.3 Furthermore, military aviation also 
demonstrated the potential for aerial bombardment.4  
 
The First World War took on a different character and shape in the varying 
operational theatres and where the Western Front was reduced to a mass stalemate, 
the colonial conflicts of the Great War were largely executed over large and open 
spaces.  Great Britain requested the Union of South Africa to take control of the ports 
of Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund on the coast of GSWA as part of the imperial 
                                                          
1.  D.E. Showalter, “Manoeuvre Warfare: The Eastern and Western Fronts”, in H. Strachan, 
(ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1998), p 46. 
2.  D.T. Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War 
(Routledge, New York, 2006), p 46. 
3.  A. Whitmarsh, “British Army Manoeuvres and the Development of Military Airpower 
1910–1913”, War in History, 14, 3 (2007), p 325. 
4.  J.H. Morrow, “The War in the Air”, in *Strachan, Oxford Illustrated History, p 268; C. 
Blount, “Modern Airpower and the 1916 Arab Revolt: What can the Modern Airman do 
to Counter Lawrence of Arabia”, Air and Space Power Journal, 23, 3 (2009), p 21. 
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strategy, thus preventing Germany from using these ports to refuel, re-supply and 
repair German warships. In addition, the British strategy required the capture of 
wireless stations in Windhoek, Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund, which were able to 
provide and maintain communications between Berlin and German warships at sea.5 
The control of the ports on the coast of southern Africa was vital to British geo-
strategy.6 
 
The Union of South Africa invaded GSWA as an extension of imperial war aims 
and fought a very different campaign in comparison to the static warfare on the 
Western Front. The UDF applied a highly mobile campaign against the German colonial 
forces (Schutztruppe) in GSWA. The open spaces of the Namib Desert and the coastal 
plateau spreading inland, provided an ideal platform for rapid and manoeuvre 
warfare.7 
  
The use of aircraft in the German South West African campaign assisted the 
ground operations in providing up-to-date reconnaissance. During the First World War 
aerial reconnaissance was used to facilitate the operational planning process and the 
commander’s decision-making cycle.8 The historiography of the campaign provides 
limited focus on the element of air operations. 
 
Whereas the first literature to appear on the campaign had a strong British 
historiographical tradition,9 there has also been a significant modern wave of 
publications revising this older methodology.10 Furthermore, there is a growing body 
                                                          
5.  G. L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service (Ashanti, Johannesburg, 1991), p 7. 
6.  Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DOD Archives), Diverse (hereafter D), Box 
8, 37, Report on the Military Situation in South Africa, 20 August 1910. 
7.  See, A. Garcia, ‘A Manoeuvre Warfare Analysis of South Africa’s 1914-1915 German 
South West African Campaign’, Scientia Militaria, 45, 1 (2017). 
8.  J. Steckfuss, Eyes All over the Sky: Aerial Reconnaissance in the First World War 
(Casemate, Oxford, 2016), p 2. 
9.  See, for example Anon., Union of South Africa and the Great War, 1914–1918: Official 
History (Government Printer, Pretoria, 1924); J.J. Collyer, The Campaign in German 
South West Africa, 1914–1915 (Government Printer, Pretoria, 1937); H.F. Trew, Botha 
Treks (Blackie & Son, London, 1936); M.E. Ritchie, With Botha in the Field (Longmans, 
London, 1915); W. Whittal, With Botha and Smuts in Africa (London: Cassell, 1917); 
H.F.B. Walker, A Doctor’s Diary in Damaraland (Edward Arnold, London, 1917); D.E. 
Reitz, Trekking On (Travel Book Club, London, 1947); P.K.J. Robinson, With Botha’s 
Army (Allen & Unwin, London, 1916); E. Dane, British Campaigns in Africa and the 
Pacific 1914-1918 (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1919); W.W. O’Shaughnessy and W.S. 
Rayner, How Botha and Smuts Conquered German South West (Simpkin, London, 1916). 
10.  See, L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service; B. Nasson, Springboks on the Somme (Penguin, 
Johannesburg, 2007); T. Couzens, The Great Silence (Sunday Times, Johannesburg: 
2014); A.M. Grundlingh, Fighting Their Own War: South African Blacks and the First 
World War (Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1988); J. Stejskal, The Horns of the Beast: The 
Swakop River Campaign and World War I in South West Africa, 1914–1915 (Helion, 
Solihull, 2014); I. Gleeson, The Unknown Force: Black, Indian and Coloured Soldiers 
through Two World Wars (Ashanti, Johannesburg, 1994); D. Williams, Springboks, 
Troepies and Cadres: Stories of the South African Army 1912–2012 (Tafelberg, Cape 
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of contemporary academic literature which re-evaluates various and specific aspects 
of the campaign.11  
 
The participation of indigenous African people in the campaign in GSWA 
remains an under-researched theme. Whereas there is considerable focus on the role 
of the South African Native Labour Contingent and the Cape Coloured Corps12 in South 
Africa’s First World War campaigns in German East Africa, France and Palestine, the 
participation of Africans, Coloureds and Indians in GSWA requires further research. 
The involvement of people of colour in the campaign in GSWA is perhaps more difficult 
to trace because they were not organised into independent units, but were rather 
incorporated into various brigades, regiments and sections as drivers, auxiliaries, 
scouts, assistants and batmen.13 Records on the strength of units indicate that there 
were eight people of colour attached to the SAAC during the final advance.14  
                                                          
Town, 2012); A. Cruise, Louis Botha’s War: The Campaign in German South West Africa 
1914–1915 (Zebra, Cape Town, 2015);  H. Strachan, The First World War, Vol 1: To Arms 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001); T.R. Ungleich, “The Defence of German South 
West Africa during World War I”, MA thesis, University of Miami, 1974; B. Farwell, The 
Great War in Africa 1914–1918 (Norton, New York, 1986); I. Van der Waag, A Military 
History of Modern South Africa (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2015); A. Delport, ‘“Boks 
and Bullets, Coffins and Crutches’: An Exploration of the Body, Mind and Places of 
‘Springbok’ South African Soldiers in the First World War”, MA dissertation, 
Stellenbosch, 2015; B. Nasson, World War 1 and the People of South Africa (Tafelberg, 
Cape Town, 2014); A. Samson, World War I in Africa: The Forgotten Conflict among 
European Powers (I.B. Taurus, London, 2013).   
11.  R.C. Warwick, “The Battle of Sandfontein: The Role and Legacy of Major General Sir 
Henry Timson Lukin”, Scientia Militaria, SA Journal of Military Studies, 34, 2 (2006); I. 
Van der Waag, “The Battle of Sandfontein, 26 September 1914: South African Military 
Reform and the German South West Africa Campaign, 1914–1915”, First World War 
Studies, 4, 2 (2013); E. Kleynhans, “A Critical Analysis of the Impact of Water on the 
South African Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915”, Historia, 61, 2 
(2016); A. Garcia, “Manoeuvre Warfare in the South African Campaign in German South 
West Africa during the First World War”, MA dissertation, University of South Africa, 
2015. 
12.  See A. Grundlingh, Participation and Remembrance: South African Black and Coloured 
Troops in the First World War, 1914–1918 (Sun Press, Stellenbosch, 2014); B. Nasson, 
“Delville Wood and South African Great War Commemoration”, English Historical 
Review, 119, 480 (2004); Gleeson, The Unknown Force; W.M. Bisset, ‘Unexplored 
Aspects of South Africa’s First World War History’, Scientia Militaria, 6, 3 (1976). A.I. 
Venter, Coloured: A Profile of Two Million South Africans in Cape Town (Human & 
Rousseau, Cape Town, 1974); Grundlingh, Fighting Their Own War; I.D Difford, The 
Story of the 1st Battalion Cape Corps, 1915-1919 (Hortons, Cape Town, 1920); DOD 
Archives, Box 2517, South African Native Labour Contingent, Commemoration of the 
‘missing’ SANLC, 1926. 
13.  DOD Archives, Adjutant General (hereafter AG), 1914–1921, G/42/25, Correspondence 
with Defence Headquarters regarding allocation of batmen, 1914; DOD Archives, 
Secretary of Defence (hereafter SD), Box 252, Strength of Units ‘Natives’ attached to the 
various Brigades, July 1915. 
14.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, Strength of Units during the Final Advance in German South 
West Africa, July 1915. 
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Despite the growing body of literature on the strategic operations and tactical 
aspects of the campaign, there are limited sources which provide in-depth analysis on 
the juxtaposition between ground and air operations in GSWA.15 This article aims to 
address the lack of focus on air operations by providing a detailed discussion on the 
use of aerial reconnaissance and rudimentary bombing missions in support of ground 
operations in GSWA in 1915. 
 
The development of the South African Aviation Corps (SAAC), which was 
established on 19 January 1915,16 was slower in comparison to that of the European 
powers that had to develop in accordance with the growing mobilisation of air assets. 
During 1915 military aviation, facilitated by new technological innovation, quickly 
developed the fighter plane and pilot.17 The narrative of airpower throughout history 
involves the central tenet of technological development and progress.18 The total 
mobilisation of the Great War resulted in a stalemate where numbers and mass were 
the main focus and appeared to be the only solution. The application of airpower by 
the UDF during the campaign in GSWA was on a much lower and limited level when 
compared to that of the European theatre of operations which mirrored the intensity 
of the conflict. Airpower in GSWA was introduced as a means of aerial reconnaissance. 
This paper postulates that aerial reconnaissance in the campaign facilitated the 
offensive manoeuvres executed by the UDF which ultimately led to the surrender of 
the German forces. The article commences with a discussion on the context and 
background of airpower in South Africa, followed by a close examination on ground 
and air operations in the German South West African campaign. 
 
Airpower, the Great War and the Union of South Africa 
 
Initial interest in aviation in terms of air balloons was initiated by the Royal Engineers 
in the 1860s. The Royal Flying Corps (where the first South African pilots were trained) 
replaced the Air Battalion on 11 April 1912 and shortly after the Royal Naval Air 
Service broke away from the Royal Flying Corps in July 1914. The development of 
aeroplanes resulted in their operational use in the 1911–12 Italo-Turkish War and in 
the 1912–13 Balkan War. The British Army manoeuvres and training exercises from 
1912 onwards included the use of aircraft and it was determined that the effective use 
                                                          
15.  W.A. Raleigh and H.A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the 
Great of the Royal Air Force (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1922); S. Monick, “The 
Third Man: Willy Trück and the German Air Effort in South West Africa in World War 
I”, Military History Journal, 5, 3 (1981); J.O.E.O. Mahncke, “Aircraft Operations in the 
German Colonies, 1911–1916: The Fliegertruppe of the Imperial German Army”, 
Military History Journal, 12, 2 (2001); K.R. Van der Spuy, Chasing the Wind (Books of 
Africa, Cape Town, 1966); T. Dedering, “Air Power in South Africa, 1914-1939”, Journal 
of Southern African Studies, 31, 3 (2015). 
16.  The South African Air Force was established on 1 February 1920. 
17.  Morrow, “The War in the Air”, in Strachan, Oxford Illustrated History, p 269. 
18.  S.H. Lukasik, “Insurgent Airpower in Historical Perspective: An Introduction and 
Prospectus of Research”, The Historian, 74, 2 (2012), p 225. 
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of aeroplanes would become instrumental to attain victory.19 Leo Amery20 mentioned 
the importance of aerial reconnaissance for static armies one year before the First 
World War commenced.21 
 
At the beginning of the First World War, there was a substantial focus on the 
development of the aeroplane as a weapon of war. The initial use of the aeroplane 
during the Great War was for the purpose of reconnaissance in direct support of the 
ground forces. This later evolved into strategic reconnaissance. The reconnaissance 
planes were accompanied by combat planes with the aim of protecting the 
reconnaissance planes. This in turn led to the creation of planes to destroy the 
protector plane and the progression of aerial combat.22 Despite the development of 
one-on-one and formation aerial combat, masses of air patrols struggled to check air 
reconnaissance flights.23  
 
The Union’s pilots in GSWA were not required to function as fighter pilots 
because the German aeroplanes were out of commission by the time the SAAC was 
deployed. The development of the Union’s airpower in GSWA was on a much more 
limited scale when compared to the European theatre and the main purpose of the 
SAAC remained reconnaissance which directly assisted the ground forces.24  
 
Amery was of the opinion that aeroplanes would be of far greater value in 
theatres of operations where there were not high concentrations of troops and where 
extended expanses of terrain and limited communications were combined with highly 
mobile operations.25 The GSWA campaign made for an interesting case study to test 
Amery’s hypothesis because it proved to be one of manoeuvre and vast distances. 
 
One of the functions of airpower is to provide current information to the 
commander throughout the operational area. The ability to find the enemy then allows 
the commander to “fix” the enemy by which its freedom of action and mobility is 
minimised. The domination of the skies and the ability to locate the enemy in turn 
facilitates complete situational awareness for the commander.26   
 
                                                          
19.  Whitmarsh, “British Army Manoeuvres”, p 327. 
20.  Leo Amery was a war correspondent during the South African War. He later edited the 
Times History of the South African War. 
21.  K.P. Epstein, “Imperial Airs: Leo Amery, Airpower and Airpower, 1873–1945”, The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 38, 4 (2010), p 575. 
22.  J.A. Hennessy, “Men and Planes of World War 1 and History of Lafayette Escadrille”, Air 
Power History, 61, 2 (2014), p 21. 
23.  A.D. Harvey, “Air Warfare in Perspective”, Air Power History, 60, 3, 2013, p 9. 
24.  Monick, “The Third Man”, p 1; Mahncke, “Aircraft Operations in the German Colonies”, 
p 2; Trew, Botha Treks, p 152; L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, p 118. 
25.  Epstein, “Imperial Airs”, p 578, p 579. 
26.  Blount, “Modern Airpower and the 1916 Arab Revolt”, p 53. 
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General Louis Botha27 commented to Lieutenant Kenneth van der Spuy that he 
was a good pilot and an excellent verkyker (pair of binoculars) referring to the 
reconnaissance function of the aircraft. Botha went on to say that the knowledge of 
enemy positions enabled him to move and place his troops accordingly.28 The 
combination of air reconnaissance with the high mobility of the mounted forces in 
GSWA proved to be effective in the later stages of the campaign.  The air reconnaissance 
allowed the UDF to know where the German forces were deployed and the 
commando’s29 mobility allowed for the element of surprise to be achieved.30  
 
While locating the opposing force was central to tactical considerations, the 
pace of the campaign was greatly influenced by logistical considerations and the 
availability of water resources.31 The campaign was characterised by extensive and 
rapid manoeuvres which were followed by operational pauses which were used to 
regroup.32 Furthermore, the great expanses of GSWA were “mitigated” through the use 
of aerial reconnaissance which became a force multiplier. 
  
The South African Aviation Corps  
 
Interest in flying for military purposes and the creation of the SAAC was facilitated by 
General Christiaan Frederik Beyers who as commandant general of the Active Citizen 
Force was sent by General Jan Christiaan Smuts33 to Britain in 1912 to observe the 
military manoeuvres and the use of aeroplanes in army operations. On his return, 
Beyers highly recommended the use aeroplanes in warfare especially for 
reconnaissance. The 1912 Defence Act allowed for an Aviation Corps to be created 
under the Active Citizen Force. Smuts was aware of the importance of aerial 
reconnaissance and put in a considerable effort to expedite the process of deploying 
the SAAC to the theatre of operations in GSWA.34 Smuts was one of the visionaries35 
who foresaw the remarkable potential of the aeroplane.36 
 
                                                          
27.  Botha was the prime minister of the Union of South Africa and the commander-in-chief 
of the Union expeditionary force in GSWA. 
28.  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, p 267.  
29.  Commandos were Afrikaner irregular military units in South Africa. They were 
characterised as having good tactical initiative, marksmanship and equestrian skills 
despite being undisciplined.  
30.  Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, pp 63–65. 
31.  Kleynhans, “A Critical Analysis”, p 50.  
32.  Garcia, “Manoeuvre Warfare”, p 113. 
33.  Smuts was Botha’s friend, partner and confidant in political as well as military affairs. 
Smuts  became the minister of defence, mines and interior in 1910. 
34.  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, p 268, p 269. 
35.  In 1917 Smuts had become a member of the British War Cabinet and promoted the Air 
Force as a separate wing, removed from the Army. Leo Amery suggested to Smuts that 
the Air Force should have a separate and independent staff. Smuts and Amery had 
become friends during the South African War. See Epstein, “Imperial Airs”, p 577. 
36.  Hennessy, “Men and Planes of World War 1”, p 16. 
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In 1913 the first South African military pilots began their training at the 
Paterson Aviation Syndicate School (which was later purchased by the UDF), located at 
Alexanderfontein. Then the candidate pilots did a course at Tempe School before being 
sent for training at the Royal Flying Corps in the UK.37 The initial training course at 
Alexanderfontein comprised ten candidate pilots as per the memorandum of 
agreement signed between Smuts and Cecil Compton Paterson.38  
 
The South African high commissioner in London negotiated for the acquisition 
of aeroplanes in October 1914.39 While the finalisation of these talks was still under 
way, Major General Henderson, the officer commanding of the Royal Flying Corps 
ordered the formation of the SAAC in November 1914 to assist with the South African 
campaign in GSWA during the Great War. Several types of planes were scrutinised to 
determine the ideal aircraft for the climate in GSWA. The Henri Farman F-27 was 
decided upon after which several tests flights were done in France.40 The South African 
pilots who were serving in other theatres during the Great War were recalled to form 
the SAAC (accompanied by some British officers and soldiers). These pilots included 
Captain (later Major) Gerard Wallace who became the commander of the Aviation 
Corps and Lieutenants Clisdal and Carey-Thomas, who were observers.41 Also part of 
the Aviation Corps were the military pilots Lieutenants Kenneth van der Spuy, Gordon 
Creed, Basil Turner, Cripps, Marthinus Williams and Edwin Emmet.42  
 
During early 1915 Turner and Emmet were sent to the Union of South Africa 
and GSWA respectively. Turner was assigned the task of recruiting further members 
for the embryonic Aviation Corps and Emmet was responsible for finding a suitable 
aerodrome in Swakopmund in GSWA.43 In terms of supporting staff, 34 mechanics 
were transferred from the Royal Naval Air Service to the Union of South Africa.44 The 
                                                          
37. Mahncke, “Aircraft Operations in the German Colonies”, pp 1, 2; DOD Archives, World 
War 1 Diaries (hereafter WW1 WD), Box 2, Air/1/1247/204/7/4, Historical record of 
No. 26 (SA) Squadron and South African Aviation Corps; and Historical record of the 
South Africa unit of the Royal Flying Corps; L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, p 269. 
38.  See, D.P. Tidy, “They Mounted up as Eagles: A Brief Tribute to the South African Air 
Force”, The Military History Journal, 5, 6 (1982). 
39.  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, p 273. 
40.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916; L’ange, Urgent Imperial 
Service, p 269. 
41.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa April 1915–1916, War Diary. 
42.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
43.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916; L’ange, Urgent Imperial 
Service, p 269. 
44.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 2, Air/1/1247/204/7/4, Historical record of No. 26 (SA) 
Squadron and South African Aviation Corps; and Historical record of the South African 
unit of Royal Flying Corps; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, 
Report by Major Wallace on the campaign in GSWA, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
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preliminary staff was supplemented by additional pilots and supporting personnel 
such as observers and logistical administrators.  
 
The SAAC initially comprised four Henri Farmans F-27 and two Blériot 
Experimental model 2C (B.E.2c) planes. The remaining staff and four of the six 
aeroplanes (two B.E.2cs and two Henri Farman F-27s) arrived by ship in Walvis Bay on 
30 April 1915 and the aircraft were disembarked on 1 May 1915. Two of the Henri 
Farman’s had been damaged as a result of the sea voyage. The first test flight was taken 
by Van der Spuy in one of the B.E.2c planes on 4 May,45 after which the other B.E.2c was 
tested on 5 May. Both aircraft were declared combat ready by 7 May 1915.46 The first 
planned task for the newly formed aviation corps was to support operations against 
Karibib, however the UDF captured Karibib before the SAAC could conduct any 
reconnaissance missions over the town. 
 
Ground operations in GSWA and the deployment of the SAAC 
 
The invasion of German South West Africa was initiated in September 1914. The first 
attempts at invading the country was a cross-border advance which culminated in a 
bloody nose for the UDF at the Battle of Sandfontein.47 The Union of South Africa’s entry 
into the First World War ignited predisposing tensions within the Afrikaner 
demographic which triggered the Afrikaner Rebellion.48 Many Afrikaners did not 
identify with the British cause and imperial objectives.49 The UDF’s campaign in GSWA 
was thus placed on hold until the rebellion was effectively quelled in late 1914. 
 
The invasion plan for GSWA involved amphibious as well as terrestrial invasion 
lines into the desolate German colony. The amphibious landings took place at Walvis 
Bay and Lüderitzbucht and the terrestrial invasion crossed the northern border of the 
Union of South Africa and entered GSWA. The force that landed at Walvis Bay became 
the Northern Force (later Northern Army) and the amphibious force that landed at 
Lüderitzbucht (Southern Force) as well as the force groupings (Central and Eastern 
Force) which executed the cross-country invasion of GSWA, became known as the 
Southern Army. Botha, who was the prime minister of the Union of South Africa at the 
                                                          
45.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa April 1915–1916, War Diary. 
46.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in GSWA, 1915, 21 July 1916. Mahncke gives the first reconnaissance flight 
on 6 May 1915, see his “Aircraft Operations in the German Colonies”, p 3. However, this 
flight may have indeed been a test flight.  
47.  For discussion on the Battle of Sandfontein, see Warwick, “The Role and Legacy; and 
Van der Waag, “The Battle of Sandfontein”. 
48.  Van der Waag, “The Battle of Sandfontein”, p 7. See also S. Swart, “The ‘Five Shilling 
Rebellion’: Rural White Male Anxiety and the 1914 Boer Rebellion”, South African 
Historical Journal, 56, 1 (2006); and S. Swart, “‘Desperate Men’ The 1914 Rebellion and 
the Polities of Poverty”, South African Historical Journal, 42, 1 (2000); S. Swart, “‘A Boer 
and his Gun and his Wife are Three Things Always Together’: Republican Masculinity 
and the 1914 Rebellion”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 24, 4 (2008).  
49.  Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, p 10. 
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time, a former Anglo-Boer War (South African War) general as well as a commissioned 
general in the British military, assumed overall command of operations as well as the 
operational level command of the northern advance.50  
 
The operational plan for the advance and invasion of the southern part of GSWA 
comprised the divergent advances of three different force groupings. The Southern 
Force landed at Lüderitzbucht, while the Central and Eastern Forces respectively 
crossed the northern border of the Union of South Africa, upon which they entered 
GSWA. These three forces constituted the Southern Army and their operations resulted 
in the capture of Keetmanshoop which restricted the rail movement of the German 
forces in the south and forced them to the north of the colony. Operations in the south 
of GSWA were concluded with the Battle of Gibeon and the UDF prisoners of war there 
were released.51 Map 1 below indicates the impact of the initial operations in GSWA 
until the start of May 1915. 
 
The Northern Army then advanced from Lüderitzbucht in an easterly direction. 
The northerly advance was constrained by the availability of logistics, water and 
transport.52 The intermediate objective of the northern invasion was Karibib which 
was a strategic rail link.53 The Northern Army captured Karibib on 6 May and 
Windhoek was taken unopposed on 12 May 1915.54 Following the capture of Windhoek 
the Northern Army took a month and a half operational pause to accumulate the 
required materiel and logistics required to execute the final advance.55 Toward the end 
of May 1915 the SAAC was deployed to the frontlines to conduct aerial reconnaissance 
                                                          
50.  DOD Archives, Adjutant General (hereafter AG), 1914–1921, Box 8, G5/305/9199, 
Commander-in-chief, Government notice for the next issue of the Union Gazette, 18 
October 1914. 
51.  W.A. Dorning, “A Concise History of the South African Defence Force 1912–1987”, 
Militaria, South African Journal for Military Studies, 17, 2 (1987), p 4. 
52.  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, p 244; Anon., Official History, p 32; Whittal, With Botha 
and Smuts, p 137; Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914–1915, p 23; 
Kleynhans, “A Critical Analysis”, pp 41, 42. 
53.  Dorning, “A Concise History”, p 4. 
54.  Nasson, Springboks on the Somme, p 74; Anon., Official History, p 40; J. Meintjes, General 
Louis Botha (Cassel, London, 1970), p 264; Whittal, With Botha and Smuts, p 62; H. 
Paterson, “First Allied Victory: The South African Campaign in German South-West 
Africa, 1914–1915”, Military History Journal, 13, 2 (2004), p 6. 
55.  Strachan, The First World War, p 565; Anon., Official History, p 32. 
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in support of the final advance.56 The deployment of aircraft in the area of operations 
was eagerly anticipated.57 
 
The first task of the Aviation Corps after assembling their planes was to ensure 
that there were aerodromes along the axis of advance which would allow the planes to 
land at the required UDF operating bases. There were already existing aerodromes at 
Karub and Karibib and the SAAC made minor modifications to the infrastructure to 
accommodate its aircraft, after which technical and logistical supplies for the aircraft 
were sent up to these aerodromes on 7 May 1915.58 The logistical and transport 
arrangements for the Aviation Corps were not ideal for the conditions in GSWA. The 
existing support systems were placed under considerable strain in getting the required 
spares, which were often lacking, from the maintenance base in Walvis Bay to the front 
lines.59 
 
 
                                                          
56.  The United Kingdom National Archives (hereafter TNA), ADM 123/144, War Records 
1914–1918, General Letters and Proceedings, Walvis Bay, May 1915; DOD Archives, 
WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 2, Aviation report on German South West 
Africa April 1915–1916, Report of Transport Officer; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, 
Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 10, Aviation report on German South West Africa April 
1915–1916, Diary No, 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-Thomas; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, 
Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the campaign in German 
South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916.  
57.  South African National Archives (hereafter SANA), Smuts Papers, Box 112, Major 
General Thompson: Report on a visit to German South West Africa, 20–27 March 1915. 
58.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
59.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 2, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, Report of Transport Officer. 
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Map 1: Result of the South African actions up to 3 May 191560  
 
On 9 May 1915, Turner and Cripps each flew a B.E.2c to Karub. On 11 May, while 
moving his aircraft up to the front, Turner crashed his plane at Karub. Van der Spuy 
conducted the first flight with a Henri Farman on 13 May and after experiencing some 
minor complications, the aircraft was returned to the workshop for technical 
adjustments.61 Supplies and personnel were sent up from Walvis Bay to Karub and 
                                                          
60.  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, opposite p 105. 
61.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 2, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, Report of Transport Officer. 
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Karibib on 12 May with 11 cars and one trailer to support aviation operations at the 
front.62 
 
The Union headquarters ordered a reconnaissance flight of Omaruru on 23 May 
1915 because the final advance was being planned.63 Van der Spuy was sent up from 
Walvis Bay with a Henri Farman on 25 May 1915 and he landed in Karub the same day. 
He proceeded to Karibib on 26 May.64 The first reconnaissance flight in support of 
operations was attempted on 27 May but was abandoned due to excessive wind speeds 
which were thought to compromise the aircraft.65 The reconnaissance flight was 
carried out the following morning and reported that approximately 20 German soldiers 
had been sighted in and around Omaruru; the remainder of the German forces had 
evacuated the town. Furthermore, it was extrapolated that the 20 soldiers were 
planning to evacuate in due course.66  
 
On the German side, aircraft were also used for reconnaissance and for 
rudimentary aerial bombardment.67 The German forces had two military pilots, 
Lieutenant von Scheele and 2nd Lieutenant Fiedler as well as Willie Truck, who was a 
factory test pilot.68 Truck was sent to Karibib by the Aviatik Automobil und 
Flugapparatefabrik aircraft factory in Germany.69 On 27 May, Von Scheele crashed his 
plane and it appears that there was no record of German flights after this date.70 
 
Early June 1915 was a time of considerable exploration for the SAAC, during 
which new and improvised equipment was tested. On 4 and 5 June the aviation support 
technicians worked on improvised bomb dropping fittings which were installed on the 
aeroplanes.71 It is interesting to note that the American military initially opposed the 
                                                          
62.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 10, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa April 1915–1916, Diary No. 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-
Thomas. 
63.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South 
West Africa, Despatch No. 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 
1915. 
64.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, 
Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on German South West Africa April 
1915–1916, War Diary. 
65.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 10, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, Diary No. 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-
Thomas; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major 
Wallace on the campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
66.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
67.  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, p 118. 
68.  Mahncke, “Aircraft Operations in the German Colonies”, p 1. 
69.  Monick, “The Third Man”, p 1. 
70.  L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, pp 268, 269. 
71.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 10, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, Diary No. 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-
Thomas. 
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idea of aerial bombing, insisting that reconnaissance was the primary function of the 
aeroplane.72 On 6 June the Henri Farman plane was flown to 12 500 feet which was a 
record by South African standards.73  The aeroplanes used at the beginning of the Great 
War had open cockpits and could reach a maximum altitude of 12 000 feet. The 
development of aeronautical technology during the First World War improved the 
limits of aircraft immensely and this surge of development produced planes which 
could travel up to 130 miles per hour and reach altitudes of up to 20 000 feet.74 The 
SAAC thus did well in reaching 12 500 feet with the aeroplanes they had available. On 
7 June the bomb-dropping fittings were tested, dropping petrol bombs from 500 feet, 
however the test proved unsuccessful.75  
 
Two more Henri Farmans arrived in Walvis Bay on 7 June and Wallace ordered 
them to be assembled and sent up to the front for the UDF’s final advance. While the 
planes were brought up from Walvis Bay, Van der Spuy conducted a second 
reconnaissance of Omaruru on 10 June and confirmed the same information as the first 
reconnaissance. Furthermore, two 16 pound bombs were dropped on the position at 
Omaruru. The bomb fittings were reported to be in good working order.76  
 
The final advance 
 
Botha had managed to accumulate sufficient stores by mid-June to carry the campaign 
to completion. The final operations involved a central advance and an extensive double 
envelopment which aimed to cut off and encircle the German forces. For the most part 
the central column was comprised of infantry formations commanded by Brigadiers H. 
Lukin and P.S. Beves. The pincer movements were executed by Brigadier Generals C. 
Brits and M.W. Myburgh who commanded the 1st Mounted and 2nd Mounted Brigades 
respectively. Brits and the 1st Mounted Brigade took a wide enveloping route in 
capturing Etosha Pan and Namutoni. Then Myburgh’s forces captured Grootfontein and 
Tsumeb in a wide envelopment.77  
 
                                                          
72.  Hennessy, “Men and Planes of World War 1”, p 21. 
73. DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, War Diary. 
74.  D.R. Baucom, “Wakes of War: Contrails and the Rise of Air Power 1918–1945, Part 1, 
Early Sightings and Preliminary Explanations, 1918-1938”, Air Power History, 54, 2 
(2007), p 18. 
75.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 10, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, Diary No. 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-
Thomas. 
76.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, 
Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol 10, Aviation report on German South West Africa, April 
1915–1916, Diary No. 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-Thomas. 
77.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South 
West Africa, Despatch No. 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 
1915; L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, p 264. 
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The UDF advanced in the face of the retreating German forces with the 
immediate objectives of capturing Omaruru and Kalkveld. The concept of “find, fix and 
destroy” was complicated by the mobile retreat of the German forces. The aerial 
reconnaissance facilitated the “find” function of the UDF’s ground operations, however 
the chances of battle were negated by the German decision to avoid combat. Botha was 
aware of the dilemma and in June 1915 he mentioned it to Smuts in formal 
correspondence. The prime minister also added that he doubted very much whether 
the Germans at Kalkveld would offer battle because they had previously abandoned 
well prepared defensive positions in favour of their retreat.78 Botha added that he was 
unable to stop the Germans from retreating because of the geography of GSWA, 
however if they decided to fight it would be likely that a decisive result would be 
achieved.79 
 
Wallace and an aviation team advanced to Omaruru with Brits and arrived on 
18 June 1915. They then proceeded to finalise the preparation of the aerodrome at 
Omaruru which the Germans had started constructing (for their own aircraft) before 
abandoning the site. Subsequently Hinchelwood and Creed arrived at Karibib on 18 
June after taking a two-hour flight from Walvis Bay.80 The construction of aerodromes 
along the axis of advance allowed for the projection of airpower throughout the 
operational theatre. The supporting elements of the Aviation Corps had 22 cars (in 
total) which were used to transport personnel and spares between the required points 
on the axis of advance and the lines of communication.81  
 
While the SAAC moved forward on the lines of communication, Brits and 
Myburgh’s forces commenced their extensive pincer envelopments to the northwest 
and northeast respectively. The double envelopment was designed to cut off the 
German retreat.82 The 1st Mounted Brigade captured Omaruru on 19 June 1915.83 
Creed flew up from Karibib to Omaruru on 19 June, where he joined up with Wallace 
and his team. Three Henri Farman planes were deployed at the front and 30 men under 
                                                          
78.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South 
West Africa, Despatch No. 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 
1915. 
79.  TNA, War Cabinet (hereafter CAB) 45/112, The Campaign in German South West Africa. 
1914–1918, Narrative of Events, 21 June 1915. 
80.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 10, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, Diary No. 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-
Thomas; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report 
on German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, War Diary; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, 
Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the campaign in German 
South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
81.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 2, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, Report of Transport Officer. 
82.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South 
West Africa, Despatch No. 4 by General Botha, covering the period 15 May to 18 July 
1915. 
83.  Ritchie, With Botha in the Field, p 55. Whittal gives the date as 20 June, see With Botha 
and Smuts in Africa, p 104. 
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Turner and Emmet remained at Walvis Bay.84 Cripps crashed his plane on landing at 
Karibib on 20 June,85 and it had to be returned by train to the aviation workshop in 
Walvis Bay.86 
 
Five reconnaissance flights were conducted over Kalkveld and Waterberg from 
Karibib and Omaruru.87 Two reconnaissance flights detailed 500 German troops 
present on 21 June who were deployed in a semicircle at Kalkveld,88 and on 22 June a 
reconnaissance flight reported 150 German troops present in the same position.89 Two 
more reconnaissance flights on 23 June were taken over Waterberg and Kalkveld 
where no German troops were found.90 Botha stated that the German forces’ strength 
at Kalkveld was known prior to the advance which gave the UDF confidence.91  
 
A further reconnaissance was done by Van der Spuy and Wallace on the morning 
of 24 June, which was the date for the UDF advance on Kalkveld, with the aim of 
determining possible locations for aerial bombardments.92 During the aerial 
reconnaissance the German forces were spotted about 56 kilometres northeast of 
Kalkveld.93 Wallace’s reconnaissance flight observed Manie Botha’s forces deploying in 
a “V” formation but no German forces were spotted in their defensive positions.94 
                                                          
84.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
85.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa April 1915–1916, War Diary; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 
1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 10, Aviation report on German South West Africa, April 
1915–1916, Diary No. 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-Thomas. 
86.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
87.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
88.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South 
West Africa, Despatch No. 4 by General Botha, covering the period 15 May to 18 July 
1915; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, War Diary.   
89.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, 
Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on German South West Africa April 
1915–1916, War Diary.   
90.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, War Diary.   
91.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South 
West Africa, Despatch no. 4 by General Botha, 15 May to 18 July 1915. 
92.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, 
Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on German South West Africa, April 
1915–1916, War Diary.   
93.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box  1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa April 1915–1916, War Diary.   
94.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the 
campaign in German South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
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Manie Botha’s 3rd Mounted Brigade took Kalkveld unopposed on 24 June.95 The 
Germans allegedly retreated as a result of the threat from Botha’s flanking 
movements.96 Wallace proceeded to Kalkveld by road where he inspected the 
aerodrome there and ordered the aircraft up from Omaruru.97  
On his arrival at Kalkveld on 25 June 1915, Van der Spuy crashed his aeroplane 
but survived with minor injuries.98 The aircraft was subsequently repaired once spare 
parts were brought up from Walvis bay.99 Wallace moved to Otjitasu accompanying the 
Union’s advance where he found a suitable aerodrome and by 28 June two Henri 
Farman’s were sent to the forward base from where further reconnaissance flights 
were conducted on the Germans’ final defensive positions.100  
 
The extension of the lines of communication, which was a result of the UDF’s 
advance, placed a strain on the entire UDF, including the SAAC because the aeroplane 
spares and logistics took a considerable time to get to the front. In the course of the 
advance an aerodrome was found at Brakpan and was used as a launching base for 
reconnaissance flights towards Otavi. On 29 June Hinshelwood and Creed each carried 
out reconnaissance flights towards Otavi during which both pilots came under fire 
from German troops and despite the German fire, both pilots successfully dropped 
their eight-bomb payload on the German position, hitting trains and troops.101 
 
The German forces were now on the back foot and prepared defensive positions 
on the Otavi – Tsumeb line. The German officers, Major H. Ritter and Capt H.O. von 
Kleist were placed in charge of delaying the UDF. Ritter and his force were deployed at 
Otavifontein and Von Kleist was deployed between Otavi and Grootfontein.102  
                                                          
95.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South 
West Africa, Despatch No 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 
1915. 
96.  TNA, CAB 45/112, The Campaign in German South West Africa 1914–1918, Narrative 
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101.  TNA, CAB 45/112, The Campaign in GSWA, 1914-1918, Narrative of Events, 1 July 
1915; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on 
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Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 
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Lieutenant Carey-Thomas; DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force 
Commanders in German South West Africa, Despatch No. 4 by General Botha covering 
the period 15 May to 18 July 1915. 
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On 30 June a reconnaissance flight was sent out to Otavi which dropped its 
payload on the German position. A subsequent flight was sent out to determine the 
location of Myburgh’s forces that had lost contact with Botha.103 The intelligence report 
provided no concrete information on the location of the 2nd Mounted Brigade but 
unequivocally confirmed the presence of German forces in and around Otavi and 
Otavifontein. Botha and the Union forces departed for Otavi and Otavifontein on the 
night of 30 June and carried out the advance through to the early hours of 1 July 
1915.104 Manie Botha led the attack on the German position at Otavifontein105 and 
following a brief engagement, the Germans forces withdrew to Grootfontein.106 Map 2 
indicates the advance on Otavifontein. 
 
                                                          
103.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in GSWA, Despatch 
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Map 2: Advance on Otavifontein107  
The 1st and 2nd Mounted Brigades advanced on Namutoni and Grootfontein 
respectively. The pincer envelopments were aimed at cutting off the retreat of the 
German forces.108 The main German force withdrew to Khorab where the final 
surrender took place.109   
 
 
                                                          
107.  Collyer, The Campaign in German South West Africa, 1914-1915, opposite p 137. 
108.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South 
West Africa, Despatch No. 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 
1915. 
109.  Anon., Official History, p 46. 
Garcia – Airpower in the Union of South Africa’s First World War campaign 
 
20 
 
 
On 1 July 1915, Creed conducted a reconnaissance and aerial bombardment of 
the German forces at Khorab. An aerial reconnaissance on 5 July located German forces 
in and around Tsumeb. The reconnaissance flight doubled up as an aerial bombing 
mission where the aircraft fired its payload.110 The reconnaissance aimed to facilitate 
ground operations by confirming the final location of German forces.  
 
The 2nd Mounted Brigade advanced on Tsumeb in early July after which they 
took the town unopposed on 6 July 1915.111 Brits and the 1st Mounted Brigade 
captured Namutoni on 8 July where the German forces surrendered.112 The UDF 
effectively outmanoeuvred and encircled the German forces in GSWA. The German 
forces in GSWA officially capitulated at 02:00 on 9 July 1915,113 with approximately 4 
000 troops and 30 guns.114  
 
Analysis and conclusion 
 
The UDF made use of aeroplanes for reconnaissance and rudimentary aerial 
bombardment during the Union of South Africa’s First World War campaign in GSWA. 
The arrival of aeroplanes in the theatre of operations on 1 May 1915 allowed for the 
Union of South Africa’s first deployment of military aeroplanes in conventional 
operations.  
 
The use of aircraft allowed the UDF to “find” the German forces which facilitated 
the mobile UDF elements attempts to “fix” the German forces by enveloping 
manoeuvres. The Germans traded space for time with their numerically inferior forces 
and constantly retreated. The UDF finally managed to surround the German forces 
completely at Khorab, inducing their surrender.  
 
The use of aeroplanes allowed the UDF commanders to understand the 
intelligence picture better and this facilitated the deployment of the Union’s forces 
(refer to Table 1). Knowledge of the location of the German forces expedited the timely 
execution of the operational plan and the battle concept. 
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There were two reconnaissance flights taken over Omaruru prior to the UDF’s 
advance. These flights confirmed the German withdrawal from their defensive 
positions and allowed the Union forces to advance with confidence and speed. The UDF 
advanced on Omaruru on 18 June and captured it on 19 June 1915. 
  
After Omaruru, the next position on the UDF’s advance was Kalkveld and five 
reconnaissance flights were conducted which determined the presence of German 
forces there from 21 to 23 June 1915. The UDF subsequently took Kalkveld unopposed 
on 24 June. Following the capture of Kalkveld the Aviation Corps reconnoitred Otavi 
and confirmed the presence of German forces on 29 and 30 June 1915. The UDF then 
advanced on Otavi during the night of 30 June arriving on 1 July 1915, after which the 
UDF engaged elements of the German force who in turn made a fighting withdrawal. 
The final positions of Khorab and Tsumeb were aerially reconnoitred on 1 and 5 July 
1915 respectively before the German forces were completely and effectively enveloped 
and forced to surrender on 9 July 1915.115 
 
  
Aerial Reconnaissance and Bombing 
Operations      
Area of operations Date 
Number of 
operational 
flights 
Reconnaissance 
flights 
Reconnaissance 
and bombing 
flights 
Outcome in terms of ground 
action 
Omaruru 
28-May-
15 1 1  0 Intelligence picture amended  
Omaruru 10-Jun-15 1 0 1 
Omaruru was taken by 19 June 
1915 
Kalkveld 21-Jun-15 2 2 0 
Intelligence picture amended  
Kalkveld 22-Jun-15 1 1 0 
Intelligence picture amended  
Kalkveld 23-Jun-15 2 2 0 Intelligence picture amended 
Kalkveld 24-Jun-15 2 2 0 
Determined locations for aerial 
bombardment 
Otavi 29-Jun-15 2 0 2 
Confirmed the presence of 
German forces Intelligence 
picture amended 
Otavi 30-Jun-15 1 0 1 
Advance on Otavi on 30 June 
1915 
Khorab 01-Jul-15 1 0 1 Intelligence picture amended 
Tsumeb 05-Jul-15 1 0 1 Intelligence picture amended 
    14 8 6   
Table 1: Aerial reconnaissance and bombing operations in GSWA116 
                                                          
115. TNA, CAB 45/112, The Campaign in German South West Africa 1914-1918, Narrative 
of Events, 9 July 1915.  
116.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 10, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, Diary No. 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-
Thomas; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol 3, Aviation report 
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Aerial operations in the GSWA campaign comprised 14 flights in direct support 
of ground operations (refer to Table 1 and Graph 1). The flights provided the UDF 
command with reconnaissance which assisted in their decision making process in 
terms of where and when to deploy. Botha was of the opinion that current intelligence 
of where the German force was positioned allowed the UDF to deploy with the 
minimum required number of troops.117 The concept of advancing with a given amount 
of troops relates to the availability of logistics to keep one’s own forces in the field and 
the availability of real time intelligence of enemy quantities and positions. 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Aerial reconnaissance and bombing operations in GSWA118 
 
Botha gives credit to his subordinate commanders in the execution of their 
sweeping envelopments of the German forces and describes the reason for the rapid 
victory as the impact of surprise on the German forces.119 The final advance 
commenced on 18 June, after which Omaruru was taken on 19 June, followed by 
Kalkveld on 24 June and Otavi on 1 July 1915. Because the German positions 
                                                          
on German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, War Diary; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, 
Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the campaign in German 
South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
117.  DOD Archives, SD, Box 252, 17138, Reports of Force Commanders in German South 
West Africa, Despatch No. 4 by General Botha covering the period 15 May to 18 July 
1915. 
118.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 10, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, Diary No. 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-
Thomas; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report 
on German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, War Diary; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, 
Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the campaign in German 
South West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
119.  DOD Archives, World War 1, German South West Africa (hereafter WW1 GSWA), Box 
23a, Citations, German South West Africa, Northern Army, Commander of the 1st 
Mounted Brigade Special Appointments, 17 February 1918. 
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(mentioned above) were captured by the UDF, the Aviation Corps advanced with the 
ground forces and prepared aerodromes at the respective positions which allowed for 
the forward projection of airpower throughout the advance (refer to Graph 2). The 
number of aerial reconnaissance flights increased in line with the requirements of the 
UDF’s advance. 
  
 
Graph 2: Operational flights during the final advance120 
 
Van Der Spuy states that according to Botha and Collyer, the use of aircraft had 
assisted in shortening the campaign considerably.121 Botha was reportedly quite 
impressed by the value of aeroplanes in warfare and mentioned that every support 
should be given to developing the use of aviation in combat.122 
 
Following the culmination of the German South West African campaign the 
SAAC went on to become 26 Squadron of the Royal Air Force and served in the German 
East African campaign and on the Western Front. Van der Spuy served with distinction 
in both World Wars and retired with the rank of major general.  
 
                                                          
120.  DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 10, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa April 1915–1916, Diary No. 2 kept by Lieutenant Carey-
Thomas; DOD ArchiveWW1 WD, Box 1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Vol. 3, Aviation report on 
German South West Africa, April 1915–1916, War Diary; DOD Archives, WW1 WD, Box 
1, Air 1/1247/204/7/1, Report by Major Wallace on the campaign in German South 
West Africa, 1915, 21 July 1916. 
121.  Van der Spuy, Chasing the Wind, p 82; L’ange, Urgent Imperial Service, p 273. 
122.  Ritchie, With Botha in the Field, p 56. 
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